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‘Ukraine’s case is a test of Europe’s fundamental values in the neighbourhood’ 
Donald Tusk, 2015 
1
 
Introduction 
Since the end of World War II, over 500 cases of economic sanctions imposed by one state on 
another can be identified (Cashen 2017). The official political goals behind these sanctions, 
ranging from nuclear non-proliferation to the promotion of human rights, are diverse and 
ambitious (Cashen 2017). A well-known example of an inter-state economic sanction is the 
United States’ blockade of the Cuban economy (Weiner 2007). Another notorious case is the 
set of economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States and allies that was eventually 
lifted in 2016 (Levs 2016).  
Since the rise of international organisations in the foreign policy domain, they quickly became 
important actors in the imposition of economic sanctions. The United Nations (UN) was the 
first international organisation to authorize and establish procedures for economic sanctions in 
1966 (Stremlau 1996) and has since then enforced economic sanctions on as much as 26 states 
and terrorist organisations (United Nations 2017). The European Union (EU) went even 
further and imposed, in a shorter period, economic sanctions on 38 states and organisations 
(European Commission 2017a).  
Economic sanctions have been extensively discussed in the academic literature, often with 
contradicting opinions and findings (Jones 2015). Previous studies range from the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions (e.g., Cortright & Lopez 2002; Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot 
1985) to what the targets of these economic sanctions should be (e.g., Galtung 1959; Moret 
2015). Limited research, however, has been conducted on economic sanctions imposed by the 
EU. The few studies that are conducted on EU economic sanctions are habitually not specified 
at one case of economic sanctions but focus onto the relation between EU bureaucracy and 
economic sanctions. Giumelli and Ivan (2013), for instance, state that EU sanctions have 
some effect but their official goals should be defined better. Biersteker and Portela (2015) 
claim that EU sanctions should be imposed in closer collaboration with the UN and non-EU 
states, such as Australia and the United States.  
 
                                                          
1
 Donald Tusk is President of the European Council. This quote is taken from his statement following the EU 
ambassadors meeting in 2015 (European Council, 2015a). 
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An ongoing case of economic sanctions that has not been researched is the set of economic 
sanctions that the EU has imposed on the Russian Federation in 2014 and is still in place. 
Early 2014, the EU has imposed a set of economic sanctions after the Russian annexation of 
Crimea and the Russian intermingling in separation conflicts in Eastern Ukraine (European 
Council 2017a). Economic sanctions imposed by the EU need to be renewed every half a year 
by a unanimous vote of the heads of states of the member states in the European Council 
(European Council 2017a). To date the sanctions imposed on Russia have been renewed eight 
times. The most recent renewal took place on December 21, 2017 (European Council 2017a). 
However, the EU sanctions against Russia seem to suffer from several negative effects for the 
EU member states. The most significant negative effect for the EU member states is that 
Russia has decided to impose counter-sanctions on the EU, causing severe economic damage 
to all EU economies (Rapoza 2015). In addition to the economic damage, the EU member 
states are divided on the measures that should be taken against Russia and the effectiveness of 
the imposed sanctions is expected to be low. The EU economic sanctions imposed on Russia 
thus seem to suffer from several problems but are still renewed every half a year by a 
unanimous vote. In this thesis, I will therefore try to answer the question ‘Why does the 
European Union continue to impose economic sanctions on the Russian Federation despite its 
negative side effects?’ In order to answer this question, I will perform a critical discourse 
analysis on official EU statements about the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. 
In this thesis, I will examine whether the liberalist take on economic sanctions is able to 
provide an explanation for the imposition and renewal of the EU economic sanctions on 
Russia despite its negative effects. According to Koga (2015), the liberalist take on economic 
sanctions assumes that economic sanctions are imposed in response to a breach of liberal 
norms and values. The influence of the liberal theory on sanctions, however, has decreased 
during the last decades since liberal norms and values have become less important in 
international politics (Koga 2015: 23). In my research, I will examine whether the reason 
behind the continuation of the EU sanctions imposed on Russia can be found in the EU’s 
emphasis on their role as protector of liberal norms and values. By researching whether the 
liberal theory can explain the EU sanctions imposed on Russia, I will be able to determine if 
the liberal theory on sanctions, even though it lost most of its academic influence, is still able 
to provide an explanation for the imposition of recent cases of economic sanctions. 
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Besides the critique on the importance of the liberalist view on economic sanctions, it is 
argued that liberal norms and values itself are nowadays not of importance anymore. Waltz 
(2016) for example, argues that liberal values have become less important over the last years 
and that there can be observed a shift towards illiberal directions in international politics. It is, 
according to Waltz (2016), currently not a good time for supporters of liberal ideas. By 
examining whether the sanctions imposed by the EU are based on the idea of protecting 
liberal norms and values, this research will also contribute to the debate around the question 
whether liberal norms and values and the liberal theory on sanctions are still of importance.  
Answering my research question will not only give an answer to the question why the EU has 
imposed and renews its sanctions on Russia, but will also show whether the liberal theory on 
sanctions, and liberal values itself, are still of importance nowadays. Since economic 
sanctions are still a very commonly used foreign policy tool by both states and international 
organisations, research on the reasons why they are imposed is also of interest to policy 
advisors and politicians. Examining why states and international organisations impose 
economic sanctions will help policy advisors and politicians to come up with well-founded 
advises on future economic sanctions. In addition, answering this question will give new 
insights in the complex reasoning and language behind the EU’s common foreign policy. 
This thesis will be built up in the following way: First, I give an overview of previous 
academic work conducted on economic sanctions, I present the liberal theory on economic 
sanctions and give my hypothesis. Thereafter, I further elaborate on my case selection, I 
present the discourse analysis method I use to research EU statements and I argue which 
statements I have decided to examine. In the next chapter, I elaborate on which liberal values 
I have decided to examine and I present the results of my research. In the conclusion, I briefly 
summarize my findings and give an answer to the main question and hypothesis.  
Theory 
Economic sanctions are far from a new phenomenon (Jones 2015). One of the first texts about 
economic sanctions is written by the Greek statesman Pericles, who wrote in 432 BC that the 
Megarians were banned from the Greek markets until they complied with his demands 
(Pericles as cited in Fornara 1975). Despite the long history of imposing economic sanctions, 
they only became an influential foreign policy tool and subject of academic interest after 
World War I (Hufbauer et al. 1985). Wallensteen (1968: 248) describes economic sanctions as 
‘general trade bans between nations, through which most of the trade between the parties is 
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affected. It purposes no use of military measures’. Hufbauer et al. (1985: 3) argue that the 
threat of imposing sanctions should already be seen as a use of force and define economic 
sanctions as ‘the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of 
customary trade or financial relations’. Miyagawa (1992: 7) uses an even broader 
classification of economic sanctions and argues that ‘they may be defined as the use of 
economic capacity by one international actor, be it a state or international organisation, or by 
a group of such actors, against another international actor, or group of actors’.  
There are, broadly speaking, three strands observable in the academic literature about 
economic sanctions. These three strands sometimes overlap in expectations, theoretical 
frameworks and results but focus on different questions around economic sanctions (Jones 
2015). I will briefly highlight the main arguments of the three strands before presenting my 
theoretical framework.  
The effectiveness of economic sanctions 
Hufbauer et al. (1985) were the first authors that have conducted research on the effectiveness 
of economic sanctions. They have conducted a large-N study on 115 cases of economic 
sanctions since 1914 and have examined if these sanctions were effective in reaching the 
official goals that were set beforehand. Hufbauer et al. (1985) conclude that at least 33% of 
economic sanctions is actually effective in reaching its official goal (Hufbauer et al. 1985; 79). 
This 33% success-rate of economic sanctions has quickly become the rule of thumb in the 
literature on economic sanctions (Jones 2015) and is later confirmed by research from 
Cortright and Lopez (2000).  
At the same time, other scholars argue that economic sanctions have no, or only marginal, 
effects. Pape (1997) opposes the work done by Hufbauer et al. by claiming that most of their 
successful cases were not effective because of the economic pressure but because of military 
pressure. The effectiveness of economic sanctions, after leaving out the cases with military 
pressure, is far below 5% (Pape 1997; Pape 1998). Other authors (e.g., Early 2015; Lacy & 
Niou 2004) that also criticize the effectiveness of economic sanctions have diverging reasons 
why economic sanctions are not effective. Some (e.g., Haass 1997; Early 2015) claim that 
economic sanctions are ineffective because they are not state’s preferred policies but are 
promoted by pressure groups and rent-seeking businesses within the imposing states.  
Others (e.g., Lacy & Niou 2004; Davidson & Shambaugh 2000) argue that economic 
6 
 
sanctions are ineffective because they mainly serve as a symbolic political tool that is used for 
domestic political reasons. 
Should economic sanctions be targeted? 
The second debate centres around the question whether economic sanctions should be 
targeted against a complete state or against a small decision-making elite within a state. In the 
first decades of research on economic sanctions, economic sanctions were seen as tools to 
target a complete state’s economy to force it to change its behaviour (Jones 2015). The 
principal idea was that when the population of a country faces enough misery, they would 
revolt against the ruling elites, resulting in the desired change (Dodge 2010; Geddes 1999; 
Escriba-Folch 2007).  
Supporters of targeted sanctions, however, claim that broad economic sanctions often fail to 
pressure authoritarian leaders to change their behaviour, since they are not dependent on 
popular vote (Oechslin 2014; Haass 1997). Moreover, they argue that the broad sanctions 
cause the suffering of people who have no influence in changing the regime’s policy 
(Cortright & Lopez 2002). Furthermore, broad economic sanctions are seen as inhumane and 
cruel (Moret 2015). Following from their critique on the broad economic sanctions, 
supporters of targeted sanctions have come up with sanctions that are meant to inflict harm on 
the responsible leaders while sparing the population from suffering (Portela 2016).  
Motivations for the imposition of economic sanctions 
The most relevant strand of literature for this thesis’ question is the debate around the 
motivations for states to impose economic sanctions. Two principal stands within this debate 
can be observed: realism and liberalism (Koga 2005).  
The realist view on economic sanctions is based on the assumption that actors are focused on 
gaining as much power as possible (Mearsheimer 2001: 32). Following from this, realists 
argue that economic sanctions can best be seen as a state’s foreign-policy instrument with the 
goal of pursuing national interests (Koga 2005). Barber (1979: 367) for instance, states that 
economic sanctions should be seen as “economic measures directed to political objectives”. 
Other realist scholars (e.g., Forland 1993; Drezner 1999) have claimed that states impose 
economic sanctions to gain a relative economic and political profit. It is important to note that 
realists have problems with defining economic sanctions. Contrary to Pape (1997), most 
realists (e.g., Rennack 2000; O’Sullivan 2003) claim that using military pressure is also a 
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form of imposing economic sanctions. Since realists use diverging definitions of economic 
sanctions, realist researches often give contradicting findings (Koga 2005). The realist 
approach of economic sanctions is frequently criticized to be suffering from several 
shortcomings ranging from the flawed conceptualizations with different views of economic 
sanctions (Koga 2005: 47: Kat 2015), to their inability to grasp the importance of international 
organisations in current international politics (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2017).  
Another perspective on examining economic sanctions is to look at it from a liberalist point of 
view. The core assumption of this standpoint is that actors should be equal and free (Owen 
1994). Contrary to the realist view, actors are according to the liberalist view not focused on 
gaining as much power as possible for themselves but are focused on the possibilities of 
cooperation (Powel 1991). In the liberalist view, cooperation between states is possible since 
states are focused on obtaining absolute gains (Powel 1991). Absolute gains mean that two (or 
more) states can profit from cooperation (Powel 1991). This cooperation between states will 
cause interdependence between them (Moravcsik 2010). Interdependence, according to 
Moravcsik (2010), influences a state’s policy and preferences since states realize that all 
actions will affect their own economy. Since states are interdependent and understand that 
they will both suffer from war, war is less likely for liberalists (Dunne 2008: 112). Therefore, 
economic sanctions are historically seen as connected with liberalism since economic 
sanctions are perceived as a way of waging war without the actual costly war (Jones 2015; 
Cox & Drury 2006: 719). Pape (1997), for instance, describes economic sanctions as the 
liberal alternative to war. Moore (2000) builds on this and argues that liberalism sees 
sanctions as the middle ground between diplomacy (persuasion) and force (coercion).  
Whereas realists argue that economic sanctions are merely an instrument to pursue national 
interests, liberalists claim that economic sanctions are imposed as punishments to a violator of 
international norms and/or laws (Koga 2005: 44). Ostrom (2014) and Rasmussen and Posner 
(2000), for example, state that actors can be pushed to follow a set of norms and values that 
are important to a group of actors if they are pressured by means of using guilt, shame or 
monetary pressure. Miyagawa (1992) states that by imposing economic sanctions and 
explaining why they are imposed, the imposer can let the world know what the important 
norms are and that the imposer is willing to punish actors that act against these norms. 
According to Miyagawa (1992), economic sanctions are therefore a way to make a distinction 
between the good (imposing) state(s) and the bad (sanctioned) state(s). The existence of 
liberal values is a prerequisite for the use of economic sanctions according to Koga (2005: 44); 
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without norms or values, there is no sanctioning act. From this follows the liberal standpoint 
that coercive acts stripped from normative and legal contents are illegitimate or illegal acts 
that should not be called sanctions (Koga 2005: 14). Liberalists do not consider self-interested 
acts or military pressure to be a form of economic sanctions (Jones 2015: 16). The problems 
with contested definitions of economic sanctions that occurred in several realist works on the 
topic are thus eliminated in the liberalist approach of economic sanctions. Consequently, 
liberalists argue that economic sanctions should not only be seen as changing a state’s 
behaviour but also as punishing it for breaking the rules (Koga 2005).   
Furthermore, liberalists take the role of international organisations into account and argue that 
they are a useful place for states to cooperate in (Ozkan & Cem Cetin 2016). Within 
international organisations, states can work together to achieve absolute economic gains 
(Oneal & Russet 2015). From their respect for international organisations follows the 
liberalist view that international organisations are the rightful organisations to impose 
economic sanctions (Moravcsik 2010). Hurd (2005) gives the example of UN sanctions 
imposed on Libya in the early 1990s; these sanctions were seen as legitimate because they 
were not imposed unilaterally but by an international organisation.  
In the following chapters, I will research whether the liberal theory on economic sanctions can 
provide an explanation for the EU sanctions imposed on Russia, even though the theory and 
liberal values itself have lost most of its importance. I expect that the liberal theory on 
economic sanctions is able to provide an explanation for the sanctions against Russia for two 
important reasons. The first, and most important, reason is that the liberal theory on sanctions 
argues that sanctions are based on liberal norms and values and that there can be no 
sanctioning act without them. Liberal values are also of central importance to the EU and the 
EU frequently presents itself as the defender of liberal norms and values such as democracy, 
freedom of speech and sovereignty (European Commission 2007). This is shown in the treaty 
on the creation of the EU that starts with stating that the EU is founded on the principles of 
freedom, democracy and the rule of law (European Union 2012). This message is repeated on 
the official websites of the European Parliament, European Council and European 
Commission. Since liberal values are of main importance to the EU, I expect that the set of 
economic sanctions imposed on Russia is grounded on this idea. The hypothesis that I will 
test in this paper is that the economic sanctions imposed on Russia are based on the idea that 
the EU should protect and further promote their liberal norms and values. If my hypothesis is 
correct, the EU has been speaking in their statements on the sanctions (in which the words are 
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chosen with accuracy) about protecting and diffusing the liberal norms and values on which 
the EU is based. 
 
A second reason why I expect that the liberal theory on sanctions is able to provide an 
explanation for the EU sanctions imposed on Russia is that the liberal theory on sanctions 
considers international organisations a legitimate platform for cooperation and sanctioning 
(Moravcsik 2010). This is of importance to this thesis since the EU sanctions imposed on 
Russia need to be renewed every half a year by a unanimous vote of the European Council 
(European Council 2017a). A theory that values the existence of this organisation seems 
therefore useful to explain the reasons why the sanctions are unanimously imposed.   
Methods  
Case selection 
I have decided to research the extreme and unresearched case of EU sanctions imposed on 
Russia for numerous reasons. To start with, the EU sanctions imposed on Russia are a mixture 
of targeted sanctions and broad economic sanctions as travel bans imposed on high-ranking 
Russian officials accompany broad economic boycotts (European Commission 2017a). This is 
remarkable because in previous cases of EU sanctions, the EU has preferred to impose 
targeted sanctions and not the broad economic sanctions (Portela 2016). An illustrative 
example of previous EU sanctions is the set of economic sanctions imposed on Syria in 2011. 
In the Syrian case, the EU has decided to impose only targeted sanctions since the population 
would otherwise suffer too much (European Council 2017d). A second reason why this case is 
interesting is that Russia has decided to mirror the EU’s sanctions and to impose counter-
sanctions on the EU (RT 2014). By, especially, targeting food imports from the EU, Russia 
has been able to do severe economic harm to many European economies (Rapoza 2015; Gros 
& Di Salvo 2017). The damage from the Russian counter-sanctions is, however, not the same 
for every member state. Italy, for example, is to a large extend dependent on trade with Russia 
and claims that the Russian counter-sanctions have already costed them over 4 billion euro 
(Cavestri 2017). The Netherlands, on the other hand, is less dependent on trade with Russia 
and claims that the Russian counter-sanctions ‘only’ cost their economy 300 million euro 
annually (CBS 2014). The EU estimates that the costs of the Russian counter-sanctions for all 
EU member states combined are around 50 billion euro (European Parliament 2015: 4). 
Furthermore, the expected effectiveness of the sanctions is low since it is, according to many 
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observers (e.g., Ashford 2016; Duke 2016), highly unlikely that Russia will implement the 
official goals stated in the Minsk agreements
2
, re-instating the sanctions seems therefore a 
nonsensical policy for the EU. A final reason why the set of EU sanctions imposed on Russia 
is an extreme case is that the EU member states are divided on the issue. Since the economic 
sanctions have to be renewed every half a year by a unanimous vote (European Council 
2017a), it is noteworthy that the member states do not appear united on this important issue 
but still vote unanimously to extend the sanctions. Especially Eastern European heads of 
states are critical
3
 of the EU economic sanctions imposed on Russia since they are more 
dependent on trade with Russia and have closer diplomatic and cultural ties with Russia 
(Bechev 2017). These heads of state criticize the EU sanctions and claim that the sanctions 
imposed on Russia are illegitimate and should be lifted. 
Costa and Jorgenson (2012) argue that the EU’s foreign policy is often subject to path 
dependency: once sanctions are imposed, it is hard to get this policy reversed or changed and 
countries will continue renewing them. Contrary to this idea, the EU has decided to lift the 
sanctions imposed on Belarus in 2016. In the Belarusian case, the economic sanctions were 
lifted overnight without any sign that Belarus had given in to the EU’s demands (Rankin 
2016). The Belarusian case shows that assuming that EU policies are irreversible and path-
dependent is not a right postulation since the EU often revises or adapts its sanctions (Lester 
2017).  
Critical discourse analysis 
In order to answer this thesis’ research question, I will perform a critical discourse analysis by, 
qualitatively, examining statements made by the European Council and the European 
Commission on the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. I have decided to research 
statements from these two bodies of the EU since they have the most important say in the 
EU’s foreign policy (European Union 2017) and their statements are therefore a good 
reflection of the complete EU’s foreign policy. By performing a critical discourse analysis, I 
will be able to examine the ideology behind the language used in official EU statements about 
the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. Furthermore, I will be capable of determining the 
argumentation strategies that are used by the EU when talking about the sanctions. 
Additionally, I will be able to distinguish who came up with the statements. Was it, for 
                                                          
2
 The Minsk agreements are agreements between Russia and the EU on a ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine. Among 
others, all heavy weaponry had to leave Eastern Ukraine within a month (European Council 2017a). 
3
 For examples of critique from Eastern European heads of states see European Values (2017) and Slobodchikoff 
(2014). 
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example, a statement made by a single commissioner or was it a statement endorsed by the 
complete European Council?   
 
A critical discourse analysis is a research method that focuses on the study of language in 
practice (Fairclough 2010). In the literature about critical discourse analysis, discourse is 
described as “an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, 
and reception, that brings an object into being. As discourse analysts, then, our task is to 
explore the relationship between discourse and reality” (Bryman 2012: 536).  
Gee & Handford (2012: 1) argue that “a critical discourse analysis is the study of language in 
use. It is the study of meanings we give language and the actions we carry out when we use 
language”. Critical discourse analyses emphasize the role of language as a power resource 
that is related to ideology and socio-cultural change (Bryman 2012: 536). It does not just 
provides an account of what goes on in society: it is also a process whereby meaning is 
created (Van Dijk 1997: 2). This involves asking who uses language, how, why and when. 
Ideologies are a topic of considerable importance in critical discourse analyses (Blommaert 
2005: 26). According to Wodak and Meyer (2001) and Van Dijk (1995), ideologies in texts 
are not shown directly but critical discourse analyses are able to expose them. Wodak and 
Meyer (2001: 28) argue that a critical discourse analysis not just cherry-picks words from a 
text but that it is a useful tool to analyse four aspects of a text. To start with, it is a useful tool 
to analyse the kind and form of argumentation that is used. Furthermore, a critical discourse 
analysis is able to show certain argumentation strategies that are used. A third strength is that 
critical discourse analyses are able to show the intrinsic logic and composition of texts. 
Finally, a critical discourse analysis is a useful tool to define who the speech actors are and 
what their position is. Both their official position and their position in relation to the text is 
important. Moreover, Bryman (2012: 537) highlights the role of actors in critical discourse 
analysis and argues that it is a method that is able to define “how particular actors draw on the 
discourse to legitimate their actions”. 
Since 2014, when the first sanctions were imposed, the EU has come up with over 200 official 
statements about the sanctions imposed on Russia. These official statements were made 
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available by the EU in the databases of the EU websites
4
. The statements were all published 
and corrected by the secretariat of the European Commission and the secretariat of the 
European Council and the words in the statements were chosen with accuracy. In the 
following chapters, I will assume that the EU’s statements are part of a broader EU policy on 
handling Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intermingling in Eastern Ukraine. From the 200 
statements, I have selected 87 statements in which the European Commission or the European 
Council speak comprehensively about the sanctions. The 120 statements that I have 
disregarded were merely technical statements about the targets of the sanctions or practical 
statements that the sanctions were prolonged
5
. I will examine the language being used in the 
87 statements and analyse whether the EU has been speaking (and if so, how?) about three 
liberal values that are marked as important by the EU. By performing a critical discourse 
analysis, I will be able to research the ideology behind the statements on the sanctions. When 
looking at the statements by the European Commission and the European Council, I will focus 
on three liberal values that are marked as the EU’s most important values in the treaty on the 
creation of the EU (European Union 2012) and in a speech by the EU Commissioner Stefan 
Füle (2014). These three liberal values are the rule of law, freedom and democracy (European 
Union 2012: Füle 2014). Before presenting my results, I will go deeper into these three liberal 
values, argue how they are defined and why the EU denotes them as its key values.   
Liberal values 
 
Rule of law 
The rule of law is one of the EU’s founding principles stemming from the common 
constitutional traditions of all member states and is one of the fundamental liberal values upon 
which the European Union is based (European Commission, n.d.). Vice-President of the 
European Commission, Timmermans, has labelled the rule of law in 2015 the ‘cornerstone of 
the EU’s liberal policies’. ‘When laws are not respected, democracy and freedom are almost 
not possible’ (European Commission 2015c). Carothers (1998) has described the rule of law 
as a system in which laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning and apply equally to 
everyone. The rule of law is further described by Barnett (2014) as the principle that all 
                                                          
4
 For statements made by the European Commission I have used the database on 
http://europa.eu/rapid/search.htm and for statements made by the European Council I have used 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/  
5
 For an example of a statement I neglected, see the European Council (2016b) statement in which only a list is 
presented of sanctioned actors.  
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people and institutions are subject, and accountable, to law that is justly applied and enforced. 
In the statements about the economic sanctions on Russia, the rule of law will be treated as 
the principle that states are subject to international law and treaties and have to comply with 
them.  
 
 
Freedom 
Freedom is seen as one of the most important values of liberalism (Joyce 2003). Christman 
(1991) claims that actors are free when they can formulate their own desires, values and goals. 
Arendt (1990) argues that in politics, sovereignty is the equivalent of freedom as sovereignty 
means that political actors can govern themselves without external or internal interference. 
Freedom and sovereignty are, according to Krause (2015: 4), fundamental preconditions for 
liberal democracies that never should be abandoned. Krause (2015) describes sovereignty as 
the possibility for states to make intentional choices, rather than acting from deference. The 
EU has often condemned non-members (for example, China) when they breached the 
sovereignty of other states by invading or pressuring them (Hill, Smith & Vanhoonacker 
2017). Sovereignty is therefore seen as an important pillar of the EU’s foreign policy (Hill et 
al. 2017). Freedom will be treated in this research as a state’s sovereignty against another 
state’s aggression or pressure through the threat of aggression.   
Democracy 
The third liberal value I will try to trace back in the EU statements is democracy, and in 
particular liberal democracy. Plattner (1998: 1) argues that liberal democracies “are home not 
only to free and competitive multiparty elections but also to the rule of law and the protection 
of individual liberties”. The European Commission (2017b) builds upon this argumentation 
and claims that liberal democracies do not only consist of transparent elections, but also 
contain liberal institutions, a political and civil society and selected human rights such as 
freedom of speech. Liberal democratization is an important part of the EU’s foreign policy 
and is seen by the EU as the most important prerequisite for a possible EU membership 
(European Commission 2017b). The importance of democracy for the EU is further 
elaborated in the treaty on the creation of the EU that states that the promotion of liberal 
democracy is the EU’s most important foreign policy goal (Bosse 2012). In this research on 
the EU statements on sanctions imposed on Russia, democracy will be treated as a system of 
free elections combined with the rule of law and protection of individual liberties.  
14 
 
Analyses 
The European Council is the most important organisation within the EU regarding the 
imposition of economic sanctions (European Council 2017f). Whereas one would expect that 
they would have come up with the largest amount of joint statements about the economic 
sanctions, this is not the case. From the 87 collected statements on the sanctions by the 
European Commission and the European Council, only 20 came from the European Council. 
From these 20 statements, over half were merely statements that the sanctions would be 
prolonged for another six months without the reasoning behind it. Statements by the European 
Commission, on the other hand, were much more focused on the reasons behind the sanctions 
than on the technical details. As one would arguably expect, almost every researched 
statement was a joint statement in name of the complete European Commission or European 
Council and not from one head of state or commissioner.   
Rule of law 
In the statements about the economic sanctions imposed on Russia, there is a great deal of 
attention for the rule of law. The European Council and European Commission emphasize the 
rule of law in three different ways. The first and most frequently used way that this concept is 
applied is by arguing that Russia should be punished with economic sanctions because of its 
illegal actions in Ukraine. An example of this is a statement by the European Commission that 
claims that ‘Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and actions to de-stabilize Eastern Ukraine 
are illegal and must stop’ (European Commission 2014d). In many other statements (e.g., 
European Commission 2014g; European Council 2015c) it is not further specified why the EU 
perceives Russia’s actions to be illegal. However, by constantly repeating that the Russia’s 
actions are illegal, the EU creates a feeling that Russia is culpable and should be punished by 
the EU. The second way that the rule of law is applied is by placing emphasis on international 
treaties and conventions. The European Commission states on March 12, 2014 that Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea is ‘a clear violation of the United Nations Charter; Russia’s 
commitments under the Helsinki Final Act; its obligations to Ukraine under its 1997 Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership; the Russia-Ukraine basing agreement; and its 
commitments in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994’ (European Commission 2014a). The 
European Commissioner for Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood policy, Stephan 
Füle, declared in the European Commission that the EU should act against Russia since it 
violates the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1990 Paris Chapter, the 1994 Budapest 
Memorandum and agreements made in 2008 between Russia and Ukraine (Füle 2014). 
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Furthermore, the European Commission (e.g., 2014h; 2015b) has repeatedly mentioned the 
importance of compliance with international humanitarian laws and has stated that, contrary 
to Russia, the EU has a firm trust in the principles of humanitarian law. Additionally, the 
European Council has constantly stated (e.g., 2014; 2017a) that sanctions are imposed 
because of a breach of international law (without further specifying what laws they refer to). 
By repeatedly emphasizing the importance of international treaties, conventions and 
international laws, the EU is able to present itself as the defender of the rule of (international) 
law. The last way the EU mentions the rule of law is by referring specifically to the Minsk 
agreements. Both the European Commission (e.g., 2015a; 2015b) and the European Council 
(e.g., 2015a; 2015b) repetitively argue that Russia should comply with the agreements made 
in Minsk in 2015, since these agreements are binding to Ukraine, Russia and the EU. The EU 
is capable of portraying Russia as a breaker of international treaties by constantly arguing that 
Russia should start implementing the agreements made in Minsk. Moreover, the EU has been 
able to portray itself as a supporter of liberal values by repeatedly endorsing the importance of 
international treaties and claiming that the EU is living up to the Minsk agreements.  
The EU’s emphasis on the rule of law seems to comply with this work’s expectation. The EU 
is in its statements speaking about the protection of the rule of law by claiming that it imposed 
economic sanctions as a reaction to Russia’s disrespect for the rule of law. Furthermore, the 
EU is promoting liberal values by repeatedly emphasizing its own respect for the rule of law.  
Freedom 
Freedom, perceived as a state’s sovereignty, is another important aspect in the EU statements 
on the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. The European Commission and the European 
Council address sovereignty in two ways in there statements about the economic sanctions. 
The first way sovereignty is mentioned is by arguing that sanctions are imposed since Russia 
has violated Ukraine’s sovereignty. Examples of this can be found in numerous declarations 
of the European Commission (e.g., 2014c; 2015b). In these statements, the European 
Commission argues that Russia should respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
independence. An example of this is a declaration that is published in March 2014 in which 
the European Commission states that ‘we reiterate the strong condemnation of the 
unprovoked violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’ (European 
Commission 2014b). The European Council follows this argumentation and argues that 
sanctions will not be lifted until Russia respects Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty 
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(European Council 2016a). Another way the EU speaks about Russia’s lack of respect for 
Ukrainian freedom is when the EU criticizes Russia’s military pressure on Ukraine. An 
example of this is when in March 2014, the European Commission states that Russia’s 
support for a referendum in Crimea is unacceptable because Russia is threatening to use 
military force if the referendum will be cancelled (European Commission 2014a). Following 
Christman’s (1991) take on freedom, actors should be able to formulate their own decisions. 
According to the European Commission, Ukraine was then also not free to formulate its own 
decisions and eventually held the (in the EU’s opinion illegal) referendum, forced by Russia’s 
military pressure (European Commission 2014a). By repeatedly stating that sanctions are 
imposed since Russia is breaching Ukraine’s sovereignty and by claiming that Russia’s 
military pressure is making Ukraine do things that go against their interests, the EU is able to 
create a feeling that the wrongdoing Russia should be punished by the EU. This feeling of the 
good EU versus the bad Russia is further strengthened by the EU’s emphasis on its own 
respect for sovereignty. In a speech on September 11 2014, the European Commission states 
that the EU has always respected Ukraine’s sovereignty and that the EU would never use 
force to pressure Ukraine (or other states) to do something against their will. According to the 
European Commission (2014h), an important reason to impose sanctions on Russia is that 
Russia was pressuring Ukraine to do things against their will. The European Commission’s 
view that the EU was respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty comes back in more statements from 
the EU (e.g., European Commission 2014h; European Council 2017c) and is another sign of 
EU’s emphasis on their respect for liberal values and Russia’s disrespect for them.  
As was the case with the rule of law, the EU statements on the sanctions also repeatedly 
mention the protection and diffusion of the liberal value freedom. The EU argues that the 
economic sanctions are imposed because the EU needs to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty. 
Moreover, the EU has been promoting liberal values by repeatedly emphasizing its own 
respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty. 
Democracy 
In the statements about the economic sanctions imposed on Russia, the European Commission 
and European Council have also referred to liberal democracy. In only a handful of statements 
(e.g., European Commission 2014d; European Council 2015c) liberal democracy is mentioned. 
When the EU speaks about liberal democracy, it is used as a way to present Ukraine as a part 
of Europe that is being attacked by Russia. A first example of this is a statement by the 
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European Commission on April 4, 2014 in which is claimed that the EU has an inspiring 
influence on Ukraine; it is the EU’s democratic values that the Ukrainians want. In a 
statement by the European Commission on April 26, 2014, the European Commission 
applauds Ukraine’s liberal democracy, free elections, constitutional reforms and amnesty laws. 
A third example of the EU praising Ukraine’s liberal democracy is a statement by the 
European Commission in September, 2014 when the European Commission appreciates 
Ukraine’s liberal democracy by claiming that ‘Ukraine stood up for its democratic 
accountability and human rights’ (European Commission 2014i). In these examples, after 
praising Ukraine’s liberal democracies and liberal reforms, the European Commission states 
that Russia’s interference in Ukraine is a danger for Ukraine’s democracy. According to the 
EU, economic sanctions are imposed on Russia because of their aggression against a liberal 
democratic state. By stating that Ukraine is a democratic state that is inspired by the EU, the 
EU highlights the idea that the EU and Ukraine are both supporters of liberal values whereas 
Russia is not. It is interesting and unexpected to see that even though liberal democracy is one 
of the most important pillars of the EU (European Council 2017e), it is by far the least 
mentioned in the statements on the economic sanctions.  
In the handful of EU statements about the economic sanctions that mention liberal democracy, 
it is mostly used as a way to promote liberal values by emphasizing its importance and 
admiring Ukraine’s efforts to reform. When the EU points to Russia’s disrespect for 
Ukraine’s democracy as a reason for the sanctions, the EU is also using democracy as a way 
to show that the sanctions are imposed to protect liberal values. The fact that the EU speaks 
about the diffusion and protection of democracy is another sign that my hypothesis seems to 
be correct. 
By investigating, through a critical discourse analysis, the language that has been used by the 
EU in the statements about the sanctions imposed on Russia, I have been able to explore the 
ideology behind them. In my research, I have focused on the question whether the EU has 
been speaking about liberal values that they marked as ideological important. Additionally, I 
have focused on the argumentation strategies that the EU has been using. In every one of the 
87 analysed statements, the European Commission and the European Council speak about at 
least one of the three values that are marked as important to the EU. All examined statements 
repeatedly emphasize these values in two ways. On the one hand, the EU speaks about the 
rule of law, freedom and democracy as a way to portray Russia as a wrongdoing state that 
needs to be punished through the EU’s economic sanctions. On the other hand, the EU is able 
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to present itself as a defender of the same values by repeatedly stating that the EU is 
respecting and cherishing them.  
Conclusion 
In this research, I sought to answer the question ‘Why does the European Union continue to 
impose economic sanctions on the Russian Federation despite its negative side effects?’ By 
performing a critical discourse analysis, I have tested the liberalist assumption that economic 
sanctions are imposed following a breach of norms and values. Since the EU sanctions 
imposed on Russia face negative side effects, ranging from costly counter-sanctions to 
members states that are divided on this issue, I have examined whether the imposed economic 
are put in place (and renewed) because liberal norms and values were broken by Russia. In 
my research, I have found that the European Commission, and to a lesser extent the European 
Council in every researched statement speak about three liberal values that are marked as 
important to the EU: the rule of law, freedom and democracy. The rule of law comes back in 
almost every statement concerning the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. The EU refers 
to the rule of law by constantly marking Russia’s behaviour as illegal. Furthermore, the EU is 
emphasizing international law and treaties; presenting itself as a supporter and Russia as a 
violator of them. Additionally, the EU repeatedly states that Russia should implement the 
Minsk agreements. Freedom (perceived as a state’s sovereignty) is also frequently being 
referred to in the EU statements. The EU argues that sanctions are imposed following 
Russia’s disrespect for Ukraine’s sovereignty. Additionally, the EU repeatedly claims that it is 
a defender of sovereignty and respects the sovereignty of Ukraine. The third examined liberal 
value, democracy, has not come back as frequent as the other two examined values. In a 
handful of statements, the EU compliments Ukraine’s liberal democracy and reforms. In these 
statements, the EU immediately continues with stating that sanctions were imposed because 
Russia has threatened Ukraine’s liberal democracy and reforms. These results prove my 
expectation, that the economic sanctions imposed on Russia are based on the idea that the EU 
should protect and further promote their liberal norms and values, to be correct. In every 
statement on the economic sanctions (short and technical statements neglected) the EU claims 
that sanctions were imposed on Russia because of a breach of the liberal norms rule of law, 
freedom and sovereignty.  
As stated in the analyses section, the fact that the European Commission has far more 
significant statements on the sanctions imposed on Russian than the European Council is 
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unexpected since the European Council is ultimately responsible for renewing the sanctions. 
A possible reason for this might be that the European Commission has more official meetings 
to formulate an opinion about the issue. Examining why the European Commission was more 
vocal on the issue than the European Council is an example of a possible follow-up study on 
my thesis. A less surprising outcome, when looking at who made the statements, was that 
almost all statements were joint statements that spoke on behalf of the complete European 
Commission or European Council. That commissioners and heads of states do not prefer to 
speak on behalf of their own, can be explained by arguing that it is easier for them to follow 
the official EU line than to go against their colleagues. Moreover, there can be argued that 
these heads of states and commissioners do not want to provoke Russia by coming up with 
individual statements but prefer to speak on behalf of the much stronger EU. A follow-up 
research could try to locate statements or speeches from separate actors and try to find if these 
statements differ from the joint statements.  
The assumption that economic sanctions are imposed following a breach of liberal norms and 
values seems to be accurate in this case. Contrary to the Koga’s (2005) view that the liberal 
approach of economic sanctions has lost its significance, this thesis finds that the EU 
sanctions imposed on Russia can be explained well from a liberalist perspective. Furthermore, 
this thesis also challenges the assumption that liberal values have become less important 
nowadays. The EU repeatedly emphasizes the importance of liberal values in its statements 
about the economic imposed on Russia and perceives itself as a defender of them. Whether 
this liberalist assumption is also correct in other contemporary cases of economic sanctions 
can be a topic of further research. Future research on this subject should also focus on the 
language of, for example, separate EU member states on the economic sanctions or the 
language that Russia has used in statements about the counter-sanctions. Other additions to 
this research could look at the statements from a more chronological or statistical angle of 
approach. Possible subjects can be how much the EU spoke about liberal values at what time 
and if this is the same in other recent cases of economic sanctions. 
The finding that the researched assumption of the liberalist theory on economic sanctions 
seems to be accurate is also of importance for policy makers. This finding can be of 
importance to states or organisations who impose economic sanctions. These states or 
organisations can make better-informed choices about a possible imposition of economic 
sanctions when they have additional knowledge about the reasons why economic sanctions 
were imposed previously. The findings in this research are also of importance for states who 
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are being sanctioned. Generally, sanctioned states want the sanctions to be lifted as soon as 
possible. By knowing why economic sanctions are imposed, sanctioned states will be able to 
get the sanctions lifted more rapidly.    
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